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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
INTELLIGENCE REPORT**

COUNTRY Spain

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SUBJECT Reported Plans for a Military Coup

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ORIGIN [REDACTED]

1. According to information of 30 June 1947, General Antonio Aranda Mata, after a short period during which he abstained from activity on orders from Don Juan, has resumed leadership of the military group which has been planning the overthrow of Franco for more than a year. Other military men involved are Generals Alfredo Kindelan Duany, Miguel Ponte y Manso de Zuniga, Jose Solchaga Zala, Juan Beigbeder y Atienza, and to a less extent, General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano.
2. Briefly, the plan consists in the establishment of a military directorate, preferably upon the voluntary resignation of Franco; if he refuses to resign, revolts in one or more military regions are planned to pave the way for the directorate. In either case, it is envisaged that the generals spearheading the plan will publish a manifesto requesting the cooperation of the people throughout Spain.
3. The main objectives of the military directorate, during its term of power, will be to maintain public order and to prepare for the establishment of a coalition government including leftists and monarchists, with the ultimate purpose of holding a plebiscite to determine whether Spain wishes a republican form of government or a monarchy. Although the directorate would be composed entirely of military men, subordinate posts would be filled by civilians.
4. Some six months prior to Aranda's two-months' exile to the Balearics, he, speaking as high chief, and Jose Maria Moutas Meras, as representative of Gil Robles, held interviews with several generals to find out if they would join in the plan. (The interviews detailed below therefore took place about July 1946.)
5. The first consultation was with General Camilo Alonso Vega, Director General of the Civil Guard. Aranda and Moutas, pointing out the progressively deteriorating situation of Spain under Franco's rule, concluded that it probably would be necessary to bring about a military uprising in order to effect a change. They asked for General Alonso's assurance that he would take no action to quell such an uprising. General Alonso listened to them sympathetically, and said that he was discouraged and pessimistic about the future of Spain, but that he could not make the promise they requested since his circumstances were somewhat special because of his close friendship with General Franco. He added that more than once he had considered requesting retirement

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so that he could give up his post, but that his personal friendship with Franco had deterred him because there was no adequate replacement for him who had the same relationship with the Caudillo. He added that the position of Director General of the Civil Guard was a vexatious one because of the constant casualties suffered by the personnel of the rank and file. He said that his losses averaged three guards every two days and that he was having great difficulty in filling vacancies.

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6. Later, Aranda and Moutas approached General Agustin Munoz Grandes, who reacted in a violent manner and, pounding vigorously on the table, said that he personally would take charge of settling the Franco affair since Franco would not go of his own free will. About two months later, Munoz Grandes requested a private interview with Aranda, at which he told Aranda that he would make available all the forces of the Madrid garrison as well as the forces of his district, to take the Pardo. At that time, General Aranda replied that the moment had not yet arrived but that he would keep the proposition in mind for consideration at the opportune moment.
7. General Jose Enrique Varela approved of the plan, but wondered who would "bell the cat." General Aranda replied that he would take the responsibility; he only required that in the event of revolt in one zone, the other captain generals and generals with troop commands would stand by and permit matters to take their course. Varela suggested calling a meeting of the lieutenant generals to present a demand to Franco that he give up the reins of government or suffer the consequences. This suggestion was rejected.
8. General Carlos Asensio Cabanillas was the most enthusiastic and the most eager to proceed with the campaign against Franco. However, General Aranda feels that Asensio is not entirely to be trusted.
9. Source states that several other generals, whose names were not mentioned, also were consulted and that all shared the opinions of the protagonists of the plan.
10. [REDACTED], while tentative steps had been taken some months ago in the direction of a military coup, as of late June the monarchist military camp was very quiet. It was his opinion that, given the fact that most of the high-ranking Army men are bound to Franco through personal loyalty or acceptance of privileges, no great number of them would make any serious effort to displace him unless conditions beyond their control, such as a deterioration in the economic situation, made his withdrawal necessary.)

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